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LESSONS FROM FUKUSHIMA: STRENGTHENING THE
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
EMILY BENZ*
INTRODUCTION
On the eleventh of March, 2011, Japan was struck not only by the
most powerful earthquake to ever hit the islands,1 but also a devastating
tsunami that struck the Iwate and Miyagi Prefectures.2 The Japanese
government confirmed over 15,000 deaths, with close to 3000 people still
missing.3 The natural disasters destroyed or damaged thousands of build-
ings, left millions without power and water, and triggered one of the most
expensive natural disaster clean-up efforts in history.4 The earthquake and
tsunami also caused damage to several nuclear facilities in the area.5 The
most famous and serious of these is the ongoing crisis at the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Complex, located in the towns of Okuma
and Futaba in Fukushima Prefecture.6 This disaster was responsible for
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thank her mother for putting up with all that nuclear talk over the dinner table, and for
reviewing the final product.
1 See New USGS Number Puts Japan Quake at 4th Largest, CBSNEWS (Mar. 14, 2011),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/03/14/501364/main20043126.shtml.
2 Japan Earthquake: Tsunami Hits North-East, BBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www
.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12709598.
3 EMERGENCY DISASTERS COUNTERMEASURES HEADQUARTERS, NAT’L POLICE AGENCY
OF JAPAN, DAMAGE SITUATION AND POLICE COUNTERMEASURES ASSOCIATED WITH 2011
TOHOKU DISTRICT—OFF THE PACIFIC OCEAN EARTHQUAKE (Feb. 20, 2013), available at
http://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo_e.pdf.
4 Id.; Millions of Stricken Japanese Lack Water, Food, Heat, NPR (Mar. 14, 2011), http://
www.npr.org/2011/03/18/134527591/millions-of-stricken-japanese-lack-water-food-heat;
Top 5 Most Expensive Natural Disasters in History, ACCUWEATHER.COM (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://www.accuweather.com/en/weather-news/top-5-most-expensive-natural-d/47459;
Victoria Kim, Japan Damage Could Reach $235 Billion, World Bank Estimates, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fgw-japan-quake-world-bank
-20110322,0,3799976.story.
5 3 Nuclear Reactors Melted Down After Quake, Japan Confirms, CNN WORLD (June 6,
2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-06/world/japan.nuclear.meltdown_1_nuclear-reactors
-fuel-rods-tokyo-electric-power?_s=PM:WORLD.
6 Fukushima Accident 2011, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info
/fukushima_accident_inf129.html (last updated Jan. 10, 2013); Eliza Strickland, Explainer:
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widespread power shortages and prompted the evacuation of many thou-
sands of residents.7
The Fukushima incident is the largest and most severe since the
accident at the Chernobyl plant in 1986, the only other catastrophe clas-
sified as a level seven event on the International Nuclear Event Scale
(“INES”).8 The plant is owned and operated by Tokyo Electric Power
Company (“TEPCO”), and contains six boiling water reactors designed by
General Electric.9 On the day of March 11, three of these reactors were
in cold shutdown in preparation for maintenance.10 When the tsunami
hit the plant, it broke the reactors’ connection to the power grid, so even
though the remaining three reactors shut down automatically as designed
after the earthquake, the emergency generators used to control the elec-
tronics and coolant systems were left without power.11 The reactors soon
began to overheat, releasing large amounts of radiation into the surround-
ing atmosphere and causing several hydrogen explosions in the plant in
the days that followed.12 The government soon ordered the emergency
response team to use seawater in an attempt to cool the reactors, ruining
them for future use,13 but water levels in the fuel rod pools continued to
What Went Wrong in Japan’s Nuclear Reactors, IEEE SPECTRUM (Mar. 16, 2011),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/energy/nuclear/explainer-what-went-wrong-in-japans
-nuclear-reactors.
7 Japan Quake: Radiation Rises at Fukushima Nuclear Plant, BBC NEWS (Mar. 15, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12740843; Japan’s PM Urges People to Clear 20-km Zone
Around Fukushima NPP (Update-1), RIANOVOSTI (Mar. 15, 2011), http://en.rian.ru/world
/20110315/163008635.html.
8 Analysis: A Month on, Japan Nuclear Crisis Still Scarring, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Apr. 9,
2011), http://in.ibtimes.com/articles/132391/20110409/japan-nuclear-crisis-radiation.htm;
Richard Shears, Fires Still Raging at Stricken Fukushima Nuclear Reactor One Month
After It Was Destroyed by Tsunami, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co
.uk/news/article-1375981/Japan-nuclear-crisis-Radiation-bad-Chernobyl-level-7-reached
-2nd-time-history.html.
9 Fukushima Accident 2011, supra note 6.
10 Richard Black, Reactor Breach Worsens Prospects, BBC NEWS (Mar. 15, 2011), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-12745186.
11 See Fukushima Accident 2011, supra note 6.
12 3 Nuclear Reactors Melted Down After Quake, Japan Confirms, supra note 5; ‘Melt-
Through’ at Fukushima? Govt Report to IAEA Suggests Situation Worse than Meltdown,
YOMIURI SHIMBUN (June 8, 2011), http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110607005367
.htm; Fukushima Nuclear Accident Update Log, Updates of 15 March 2011, IAEA (Mar. 15,
2011), http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/fukushima150311.html.
13 Thomas H. Maugh II, Japan Quake: 2nd Reactor Cooled with Seawater to Avert
Meltdown, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/13/science/la
-sci--japan-quake-reactor-20110313.
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drop, causing more overheating.14 The government ordered evacuations
in the surrounding twelve miles, and eventually electrical power was
restored to some of the reactors, allowing for automated cooling.15
During the emergency, the Japanese government continually
brushed off international cries of alarm and initially assessed the acci-
dent as only a level 4 on the INES.16 Many in the international commu-
nity have criticized the Japanese government for their response. Among
the biggest criticisms is of the government’s poor communication,17 regu-
latory failures,18 and hesitance to admit the full scale and severity of the
disaster.19 Many continue to be unable to return to their homes,20 inves-
tigations of TEPCO have commenced,21 and bans on food grown in the
14 NUCLEAR EMERGENCY RESPONSE HEADQUARTERS, GOV’T OF JAPAN, REPORT OF JAPANESE
GOVERNMENT TO THE IAEA MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ON NUCLEAR SAFETY—THE
ACCIDENT AT TEPCO’S FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS 9 (June 2011), available
at http://www.ornl.gov/sci/nsed/outreach/presentation/2011/Beatty.pdf.
15 Kosaku Narioka, Japan Nuclear Fight May Have Turned Corner, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704021504576210251376606080
.html.
16 Japan Rates Quake Less Serious than Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, REUTERS (Mar. 12,
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/12/us-japan-quake-rating-idUSTRE72B2FR
20110312; Japan Earthquake: Meltdown Alert at Fukushima Reactor, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12733393.
17 John M. Glionna, Report: Japan, Utility at Fault for Response to Nuclear Disaster, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 26, 2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2011/12/japans-march
-11-earthquake-and-tsunami-fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-power-plant-meltdown.html.
18 Daniel Kaufmann & Veronika Penciakova, Japan’s Triple Disaster: Governance and
the Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Crises, BROOKINGS (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www
.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0316_japan_disaster_kaufmann.aspx [hereinafter Kaufmann
& Penciakova, Japan’s Triple Disaster].
19 While the Japanese initially rated the severity of the disaster as a level 4 on the INES
scale, several parties argued that this rating was too low and only took account of each
reactor as a separate incident, instead of rating the entire disaster together. See Simon
Shuster, Fire at Fourth Reactor: Is Worse Yet to Come in the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster?,
TIME MAGAZINE (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2059232,00
.html; Marie Maitre & Matthew Jones, UPDATE 1—French Nuclear Agency Now Rates
Japan Accident at 6, REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/15
/japan-quake-nuclear-france-idUSLDE72E2M920110315; GREENPEACE, FUKUSHIMA
ALREADY LEVEL 7 CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT: GREENPEACE ANALYSIS CONCLUDES
(2011), available at http://www.greenpeace.de/fileadmin/gpd/user_upload/themen/atomkraft
/INES_7march_25th.pdf.
20 Evacuees of Fukushima Village Report Split Families, Growing Frustration, MAINICHI
SHIMBUN (Jan. 30, 2012), available in English at http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php
?article24296.
21 Masami Ito, Official Probe Begins into Nuclear Disaster, JAPAN TIMES (June 8, 2011),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110608a1.html; THE NAT’L DIET OF JAPAN, THE
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area have been considered.22 The government declared the plant stable
on 16 December 2011, but it is estimated that it will take decades to de-
contaminate the surrounding area and decommission the plant entirely.23
The latter part of the 20th century has seen a boom in the support
for nuclear power around the world, with countries like France, the United
States, and Japan building more plants, creating new reactor designs,
and assisting emerging economies like China in the development of their
own nuclear power systems. Disasters like Chernobyl seem all but forgot-
ten in this new nuclear age. In the wake of the recent disaster at Japan’s
Fukushima Daiichi plant, however, many in Japan and around the globe
have begun to look more closely at the international nuclear regulatory
regime. The International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) oversaw the
creation of five Conventions, which outline the international standards
for nuclear safety and liability, cooperation in the event of a disaster, and
an early notification system between nations.24 The IAEA has also passed
a rather extensive series of nuclear safety principles, guides, and stan-
dards, but these are not directly binding on member states.25 As such,
some states have failed to implement these regulations, or have passed
implementing legislation and failed to abide by their own rules.26
Japan has visibly and consistently gained international attention
for its failed nuclear safety regime. Not only does the government often
remain in the dark about conditions at the plants, but the private corpo-
rations have, in the past, covered up details regarding these conditions and
their own culpability. These failures of the national notification system
have resulted in damages to public health and well-being, nationwide in-
vestigations, and anti-nuclear demonstrations. The disaster at Fukushima
highlighted the inability of national regulatory efforts and the current in-
ternational nuclear safety regime to protect the public well-being in the
event of a nuclear incident.
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION
COMMISSION: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 10–11 (2012), available at http://www.nirs.org
/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf.
22 Fredrik Dahl, Japan Mulls Fukushima Food Sale Ban: IAEA, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/19/us-japan-nuclear-food-idUSTRE72I1X120110319.
23 Japan PM Says Fukushima Nuclear Site Finally Stabilised, BBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16212057.
24 Karen McMillan, Strengthening the International Legal Framework for Nuclear Energy,
13 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 983, 990 (2001).
25 See IAEA Safety Standards, IAEA, http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/documents/default
.asp?sub=170 (last updated Feb. 20, 2013).
26 See McMillan, supra note 24, at 998–1005.
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This Note proposes that strengthening the international nuclear
energy regulatory system could help prevent future accidents like the one
that occurred at Fukushima. In particular, a stronger international regu-
latory body could assist and encourage states to implement better safety
regulations. The discussion will begin with an examination of the current
regulatory system for nuclear energy. Part I will explore national regula-
tions, focusing on Japan and its nuclear safety history. This section will
point out the continuing safety laxness prevalent among even the advanced
nuclear states like Japan. It will also explore the differences between the
Japanese regulatory system and the American regulatory system in order
to determine whether the safety lapses and mistakes are prevalent across
states, or are confined to Japan. Part II will continue the examination of
the current regulatory system by exploring how the international commu-
nity attempts to regulate across national borders in an effort to influence
states like Japan to improve their safety regulation.
Part III will explore how this international system still has several
weaknesses which keep it from effectively promoting international nu-
clear safety. This section will make several recommendations for how to
strengthen international nuclear safety. First, it will focus on what changes
states can make to their regulatory systems, including the introduction
of increased transparency and public participation measures. The section
will then recommend further development of the current peer review pro-
cess in order to enforce international safety standards. Finally, the section
will argue for strengthening the largest and most influential regulatory
body, the International Atomic Energy Agency, in order to encourage
states to make regulatory changes and enforce broader safety standards
across national lines.
I. PROBLEMS WITH NATIONAL REGULATION
A. Current Japanese Nuclear Regulatory System
The starting point for analysis of Japan’s nuclear regulatory scheme
is the Atomic Energy Basic Law. This law, passed in 1955, states as its
objectives the securing of energy resources for the future and the promo-
tion of research, development and use of nuclear energy for solely peace-
ful purposes.27 It establishes the basic framework for the regulation of
nuclear energy in Japan. However, the most important laws referring to
the regulation of specific nuclear activities are the Law for the Regulation
27 Atomic Energy Basic Act, Act No. 186 of 1955, art. 1, 2 (Japan), available at http://www
.nsr.go.jp/archive/nsc/NSCenglish/documents/laws/1.pdf.
850 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 37:845
of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors,28 the Law
Concerning Prevention from Radiation Hazards Due to Radioisotopes,29
and the Law on Compensation for Nuclear Damage.30
In 1998, the Government Reorganization Basic Law (“Basic Law”)31
and various other administrative laws reorganized the Japanese govern-
ment, merging two important nuclear regulatory agencies into one.32 Pre-
viously, the Science and Technology Agency (“STA”) and the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (“MITI”) divided the responsibility for
the oversight of nuclear regulation.33 Following the reorganization, the STA
was merged with the Ministry of Education to become the Ministry of Edu-
cation, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (“MEXT”), while MITI was
renamed the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (“METI”).34 At the
time of Fukushima, there were several different agencies, each with their
own defined, but sometimes overlapping, authorities to regulate the nuclear
industry. The Nuclear Safety Commission (“NSC”) is responsible for the
basic policy of Japanese nuclear safety regulation.35 The oversight for ex-
perimental and research reactors, along with facilities using radioisotopes,
was given to MEXT.36 The Nuclear Industrial Safety Agency (“NISA”),
under the umbrella of METI, is responsible for general oversight and in-
spection of all commercial nuclear facilities and for the enforcement of
nuclear regulations.37 METI also oversees the Agency for Natural Re-
sources and Energy, the primary agency responsible for the promotion
of nuclear power.38
28 Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors,
Act No. 166 of 1957 (Japan), available at http://www.nsr.go.jp/archive/nisa/english/resources
/legislativeframework/files/ReactorRegulation.pdf.
29 Law Concerning Prevention from Radiation Hazards Due to Radioisotopes, Act No. 167
of 1957 (Japan).
30 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Act No. 147 of 1961, as amended by Act
No. 19 of 2009 (Japan), available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/japan-docs
/Japan-Nuclear-Damage-Compensation-Act.pdf.
31 Government Reorganization Basic Law, Act No. 103 of 1998 (Japan).
32 ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, NUCLEAR LEGIS-
LATION IN OECD COUNTRIES: REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR
ACTIVITIES, JAPAN 3 (2011) [hereinafter NUCLEAR LEGISLATION IN OECD COUNTRIES,
JAPAN], available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/japan.pdf.
33 Id. at 3.
34 Id. at 3.
35 Gail Marcus, Japanese Nuclear Regulation: A Call for Change, NUKE POWER TALK
(May 13, 2011), http://nukepowertalk.blogspot.com/2011/05/japanese-nuclear-regulation
.html [hereinafter Marcus, A Call for Change].
36 Id.
37 Id.; REPORT OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, supra note 14, at 3.
38 Marcus, A Call for Change, supra note 35.
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The Atomic Energy Commission (“AEC”) and NSC are purely ad-
visory bodies with the ability to make recommendations to these agencies,
and are involved in consultation with the agencies regarding licensing and
other regulatory activities.39 The AEC was established under the Basic Law
to develop policies regarding the research, development, and use of nuclear
energy.40 It makes recommendations regarding the policies underlying
nuclear energy, the coordination of government agencies, the promotion
of nuclear research, the policies of professional and technical training, and
the collection of data, research, and statistics regarding nuclear energy.41
The NSC was created in 1978 to separate nuclear safety from the promo-
tion of nuclear energy as handled by the AEC.42 It may make recommen-
dations defining regulatory safety policies and issue safety guidelines.43
Of the many laws that govern nuclear energy in Japan, it is the Law
for the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and
Reactors that governs the siting, construction, and operation of Japan’s
nuclear power plants.44 The regulations governing the establishment, op-
eration, and decommissioning of facilities are broken down by the type of
facility.45 METI handles electricity reactors, spent fuel storage and re-
processing facilities, and waste disposal centers.46 MEXT is in charge of
granting approval for construction, operation, and decommissioning of re-
actors, those reactors not used for electricity, and for the facilities using
nuclear fuels for those activities not covered under other licenses.47
When MEXT grants its licenses, it utilizes what is called the “double
check system” in Japan.48 Under this system, the applicant provides MEXT
with the required documentation detailing the design of the planned facil-
ity, its financial and technical capabilities, and the characteristics of the
site requested.49 MEXT then reviews these documents against national
safety guidelines with the assistance of an advisory specialist group.50
39 NUCLEAR LEGISLATION IN OECD COUNTRIES, JAPAN, supra note 32, at 15–16.
40 Id. at 15.
41 Id. at 15.
42 Id. at 16.
43 Id. at 16; REPORT OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, supra note 14, at 3.
44 HIROKI ICHIKAWA, JAPAN ATOMIC ENERGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SAFETY REGULATION
OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN JAPAN 1 (2002), available at http://www.ansn-jp.org/images
/doc/prearranged-group/FM-L-02.pdf.
45 Id. at 1.
46 Id. at 1.
47 Id. at 1–2.
48 Id. at 2.
49 Id. at 2.
50 ICHIKAWA, supra note 44, at 2.
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The second stage of review occurs when MEXT passes this application over
to the AEC and NSC for their review.51 After the general construction is
approved at both stages, the applicant must then submit documents to
MEXT, which include the detailed design of the facility, the construction
and inspection plans, seismic reports, and mechanical stress analysis for
the reactors and reactor cores to prove that the facility will comply with
the safety principles stated during the previous review.52
Once the construction license is granted, no changes may be made
without the approval of MEXT.53 Before operation can begin, MEXT will
carry out an inspection to ensure one last time that the finished facility
conforms to the approved design, methods, and technical standards from
the previous reviews.54 This includes an analysis of the operator’s safety
rules and procedures.55 Once the facility is approved, it will undergo an-
nual inspections by MEXT and must provide operating plans to be re-
viewed by the ministry and checked against safety requirements.56 An
operating license can be revoked at any time if the operator fails to comply
with regulations, any applicable orders made by regulatory authorities,
or any license condition.57
B. Japan’s Nuclear Safety Record
In examining the effectiveness of a national nuclear safety regime,
it is important to look at the country’s safety record. Japan’s safety history
is marred by regulatory and safety lapses, pointing to the flawed nature
of its regulatory scheme. The first Japan Powered Demonstration Reactor
(“JPDR”) went into operation in 1963, marking the beginning of successful
nuclear power generation on the islands.58 Shortly thereafter, the private
utility companies started building their own reactors, with the first com-
mercial plant opening in 1966 at Tokaimura.59 By 2004, Japan had become
the third-largest producer of commercial nuclear energy in the world after
51 Id. at 2; NUCLEAR LEGISLATION IN OECD COUNTRIES, JAPAN, supra note 32, at 5.
52 ICHIKAWA, supra note 44, at 3.
53 NUCLEAR LEGISLATION IN OECD COUNTRIES, JAPAN, supra note 32, at 5.
54 Id. at 5; ICHIKAWA, supra note 44, at 3.
55 NUCLEAR LEGISLATION IN OECD COUNTRIES, JAPAN, supra note 32, at 5; ICHIKAWA,
supra note 44, at 3.
56 NUCLEAR LEGISLATION IN OECD COUNTRIES, JAPAN, supra note 32, at 5.
57 Id. at 5.
58 HAJIMU MAEDA, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, NUCLEAR ENERGY IN JAPAN—CURRENT
STATUS AND FUTURE 2 (2004), available at http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/iinkai/teirei
/siryo2004/kettei/speech040627.pdf.
59 Id. at 2.
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the United States and France.60 However, during this time a number of
safety-related incidents occurred at plants and facilities across the islands.61
The first major incident occurred in 1981 at the Tsuruga Nuclear
Power Plant in Fukui Prefecture.62 This accident occurred when a worker
forgot to shut down a valve, and despite efforts to quickly contain the re-
sulting spill of radioactive sludge, sixteen tons of waste were spilled into
Wakasa Bay on the west coast of Japan.63 The Japanese government made
no public statement, and the public was not informed until a month later
when a local newspaper broke the story.64 The Atomic Power Commission
admitted the spill, but denied any serious public exposure to dangerous
levels of radiation, despite findings that seaweed in the area had radioac-
tive levels ten times higher than normal.65 This led to further discoveries
that earlier that year, forty-five workers had been exposed to radiation
at the same plant, and no mention had been made of this incident to the
government or the public.66
In 1995, another accident occurred at the Monju reactor.67 This
plutonium facility suffered a serious accident and leaked a sodium cool-
ant into the surrounding environment.68 While the alarm at the plant
sounded at 7:30 AM, the plant did not go into full shutdown until 9:00
AM.69 Later investigation uncovered that this time had been spent by the
semi-government agency in charge of the plant in covering up the extent
of the damage, including the editing of a video of the accident presented
to the media.70 The facility was not reopened until 2010 in response to
public outcry over the scandal.71
60 Id. at 2.
61 Id. at 4.
62 Tim Shorrock, Japan’s Nuclear Nightmare, TIMSHORROCK.COM (Mar. 18, 2011), http://
timshorrock.com/?p=1137; see also Japanese Power Plant Leaks Radioactive Waste,
HISTORY, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/japanese-power-plant-leaks-radioactive
-waste (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
63 Shorrock, supra note 62.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 MAEDA, supra note 58, at 4; Kennedy Maize, A Short History of Nuclear Power in Japan,
POWERBLOG (Mar. 14, 2011, 10:05 AM), blog.powermag.com /index.php/2011/03/14/a-short
-history-of-nuclear-power-in-japan/.
68 Michiyo Nakamoto, Japan Reminded of Nuclear Safety Fears, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 13,
2011, 9:45 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/92ce9b50-4cbb-11e0-8da3-00144feab49a.html
#axzz2RDi3NgCC.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Maize, supra note 67.
854 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 37:845
In 1999, the nuclear processing plant at Tokaimura experienced
a criticality accident, which exposed over a hundred local residents to low
levels of radiation and resulted in the first deaths related to the domestic
nuclear power industry in Japan.72 The accident occurred when workers
at the facility were preparing enriched fuel for an experimental breeder
reactor on site when they accidentally allowed too much uranium into the
mixing vessel, causing the material to reach critical mass and causing
radiation leakage that later led to two of the workers’ deaths.73 The oper-
ator, Japan Nuclear Fuel Conversion Company, had modified its safety
procedures without government approval and removed some measures
that would have prevented a criticality accident.74 The IAEA officially
stated that the accident was due to “human error and serious breaches
of safety principles.”75
Another scandal occurred in 2002, when it was revealed that
TEPCO, the same operator of the Fukushima plant, had been improper-
ly handling internal inspection records.76 These revelations included
the finding that TEPCO had deliberately falsified data on the plant in
order to comply with regulations concerning waste discharge into the
sea.77 In response, the government shut down all seventeen of TEPCO’s
reactors until 2005, but serious doubts about the safety culture of the
company remained.78
An earthquake damaged the Kashiwazaki Kariwa plant, the world’s
largest plant, in 2007, which led to a release of radioactive material into
the atmosphere in a fashion similar to the Fukushima incident.79 TEPCO
admitted that the plant was not designed to withstand an earthquake of
that magnitude and shut down the plant for twenty-one months.80 This in-
cident further raised doubts about TEPCO’s emergency preparedness,
especially in light of its previous assurances that the facility was not built
in an earthquake zone.81 This followed a 2005 incident at Onagawa where
72 Nakamoto, supra note 68; see also Megan Brynhildsen, Problems in the Nuclear Age:
The 1999 Nuclear Accident in Japan, 11 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 241 (2000).
73 Maize, supra note 67.
74 Nakamoto, supra note 68.
75 Maize, supra note 67.
76 MAEDA, supra note 58, at 5.
77 Nakamoto, supra note 68.
78 MAEDA, supra note 58, at 5.
79 Nakamoto, supra note 68.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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a plant was shut down following an earthquake which seismic monitors
later confirmed were beyond its design capacity.82
In response to the incident at Tokaimura in 1999, the Japanese
government passed the Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for
Nuclear Disaster (“Special Law”).83 Under the Special Law, nuclear oper-
ators are mandated to prepare emergency plans in consultation with local
mayors and prefectural governors.84 In addition, they must also establish
Nuclear Disaster Prevention Organizations responsible for preventing
and mitigating nuclear emergencies.85 The organizations are overseen by
managers for nuclear disaster prevention, appointed by the operators, who
are tasked with relaying information between ministers, mayors, and gov-
ernors after an accident has taken place.86 The operator must also install
and maintain safety equipment, including radiation monitors, radiation
protection clothing, and emergency communication equipment.87
Despite these regulations, TEPCO has been consistently criticized
for its response to the Fukushima disaster, as it has been in the past for
other incidents.88 According to the Wall Street Journal, TEPCO “greatly
underestimated the scope of a potential accident at its Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear plant, calling for only one stretcher, one satellite phone and 50
protective suits” for all the workers at the plant.89 The emergency plans
envisioned by the Special Law are meant to guide responders in emergen-
cies, and are approved by the government.90 However, TEPCO’s plans were
overly optimistic and contained no guidance in a worst-case scenario like
the one that actually occurred in March 2011, where the plant cannot
respond to the situation internally and cannot reach help nearby.91 What
is worse is that experts do not believe that many operators throughout
the islands are prepared for a disaster on the magnitude of Fukushima,
82 Maize, supra note 67.
83 MAEDA, supra note 58, at 4.
84 NUCLEAR LEGISLATION IN OECD COUNTRIES, JAPAN, supra note 32, at 6.
85 Id. at 6.
86 Id. at 6.
87 Id. at 6.
88 See Nathaniel Parish Flannery, Did Management Problems at TEPCO Cause Japan’s
$15B Radiation Leak?, FORBES (May 27, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanielparish
flannery/2011/05/27/did-management-problems-at-tepco-cause-japans-15b-radiation-leak/.
89 Phred Dvorak & Peter Landers, Japanese Plant Had Barebones Risk Plan, WALL ST.
J. (Mar. 31, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487037125045762329
61004646464.html.
90 Id.
91 See id.
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pointing to a fault in the government’s ability to enforce strict response
plans across the industry.92
C. Regulatory Problems
What is so wrong with the Japanese regulatory system that it can-
not prevent accidents and incidents like those that have occurred across
the islands and throughout its nuclear history, nor allow proper and effec-
tive emergency response? There are at least three government practices
unique to Japan that could be contributing to some of the nation’s prob-
lems with nuclear energy: the lack of organizational independence, the
too-close-for-comfort relationship between the regulators and industry,
and the lack of technical ability of the regulatory staff.
The first of these problems is perhaps the most easily fixed. Accord-
ing to Gail Marcus, an independent nuclear power consultant and former
employee of the American Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
the placement of the [regulator] within a government’s
structure does matter because of both the perception and
the real possibility that a regulatory organization that is
subordinate to other government functions could be sub-
ject to pressures to slant its judgments to help support the
other missions of the parent body.93
In the Japanese regulatory system, NISA is under the larger parent body
of METI, embedding the primary regulatory agency within the nuclear
industry promotional department.94 This means that METI often has two
competing roles: to ensure the safety of nuclear power operation and to pro-
mote the development of Japanese nuclear technology.95 On June 1, the
IAEA urged Japan to reform this system to ensure more independence
92 See id.; Daniel Kaufmann & Veronika Penciakova, Preventing Nuclear Meltdown:
Assessing Regulatory Failure in Japan and the United States, BROOKINGS (Apr. 1, 2011),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/04/01-nuclear-meltdown-kaufmann
(“The Fukushima nuclear crisis has exposed NISA’s failure to respond to the evolving
scientific data and technology and to enforce regulations strictly.”).
93 Gail Marcus, Japanese Regulation: The Elements of Independence, NUKE POWER TALK
(Aug. 11, 2011), http://nukepowertalk.blogspot.com/2011/08/japanese-regulation.html
[hereinafter Marcus, Elements of Independence].
94 Marcus, A Call for Change, supra note 35; REPORT OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, supra
note 14, at 3.
95 Yuka Hayashi, Nuclear Regulator Tied to Industry, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2011), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703696704576222340033889606.html.
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for the regulatory bodies.96 The Japanese have since stated that they
will create such an independent agency, recognizing that it is often “not
clear who has the primary responsibility for ensuring citizens’ safety in
an emergency.”97
Much of this closeness between the regulators and the industry
is attributed to what is called “the nuclear power village.”98 This close circle
is used to denote the “nontransparent, collusive interests that underlie
the establishment’s push to increase nuclear power despite the discovery
of active fault lines under plants, new projections about the size of tsu-
namis, and a long history of cover-ups of safety problems,” a veritable
“culture of complicity.”99 The New York Times asserts that like-minded
politicians, regulators, scientists, and industry officials have “prospered
by rewarding one another with construction projects, lucrative positions,
and political, financial and regulatory support.”100
The nuclear power village depends for its existence on a practice
called amakudari, or “descent from heaven.”101 This practice is not unique
to the nuclear industry, and may stem from American occupation reforms
after World War II when the U.S. was attempting to transition Japan from
a government-controlled economy to a market economy.102 This system
institutionalizes the movement of retiring government officials into pri-
vate industries they once regulated.103 The stepped promotion system leads
many public-sector Japanese to retire relatively young from government
service, but Japan also suffers from an inadequate pension system, result-
ing in many people in their mid-to late 50s facing a retirement without a
sufficient income.104
96 Nuclear Crisis: How It Happened/‘Nuclear Power Village’ a Cozy, Closed Community,
YOMIURI SHIMBUN (June 16, 2011), http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T11061500
5652.htm.
97 REPORT OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, supra note 14, at 38.
98 Nuclear Crisis, supra note 96.
99 Norimitsu Onishi & Ken Belson, Culture of Complicity Tied to Stricken Nuclear Plant,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/world/asia/27collusion
.html?pagewanted=all.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Gail Marcus, Fukushima and Amakudari: A Problem with a Long History, NUKE POWER
TALK (May 6, 2011), http://nukepowertalk.blogspot.com/2011/05/fukushima-and-amakudari
.html [hereinafter Marcus, Fukushima and Amakudari].
103 Marcus, Elements of Independence, supra note 93.
104 Marcus, Fukushima and Amakudari, supra note 102; Yukiko Yoda, The Changing
Nature of Amakudari, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON UNDERGRADUATE
RESEARCH 3450 (Apr. 6–8, 2006).
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To remedy this problem, government personnel departments assist
these retirees in finding positions in the private sector, particularly in
those industries that feel pressured by their relationship with the govern-
ment body to accept the retirees.105 Not only does this often place people
in ill-fitting positions in private industry, but also fosters a sense of obliga-
tion and loyalty between the retiree and his former employer.106 This revolv-
ing door, at the very least, creates a conflict of interest, particularly in the
nuclear industry.107 The New York Times points out that from 1959 to 2010,
four former high-level ministry officials successively served as vice presi-
dents of TEPCO, a “reserved seat” at the company for ministry retirees.108
This system also flows the other way in a process called amaagari
(or “ascent to heaven”), where former industry professionals retire and
are subsequently employed by the regulators as full-time technical experts,
despite the fact that they are unlikely to criticize their former employers.109
This system contributes to the third major problem with the Japanese
regulatory system: the lack of technical experts among regulators. Most
government employees in Japan are professional bureaucrats, true gen-
eralists who spend their career hopping between different sections of the
same government body without ever becoming experts in a particular area
of their agency’s work.110 This means that the regulators are very reliant
on the opinions of experts, as they are unable to develop their own indepen-
dent assessments.111 They are also unable to correct any technical mistakes,
oversights, or biases in the expert’s work.112 In November of 2011, it was re-
vealed that NISA copied inspection procedures prepared by one of the com-
panies it regulates in order to prepare its own inspection procedures.113
105 Marcus, Elements of Independence, supra note 93; Ulrike Schaede, The “Old Boy”
Network and Government-Business Relationships in Japan, 21 J. OF JAPANESE STUDIES
293, 311, 314–15 (1995).
106 Schaede, supra note 105, at 297, 299. There is also an argument that this system and
the feelings of loyalty toward former government employees it fosters in retirees is linked
to deep components of Japanese culture. See Jong S. Jun & Hiromi Muto, The Hidden
Dimensions of Japanese Administration: Culture and Its Impact, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
125, 128–29 (1995).
107 Kaufmann & Penciakova, Japan’s Triple Disaster, supra note 18.
108 Onishi & Belson, supra note 99.
109 Id.
110 Schaede, supra note 105, at 295; Gail Marcus, Nuclear Regulatory Independence in
Japan: The Role of Technical Capability, NUKE POWER TALK (July 24, 2011), http://nuke
powertalk.blogspot.com/2011/07/nuclear-regulatory-independence-in_24.html [hereinafter
Marcus, Role of Technical Capability].
111 Marcus, Role of Technical Capability, supra note 110; Onishi & Belson, supra note 99.
112 Marcus, Role of Technical Capability, supra note 110.
113 Sloppy Inspection Procedures Threaten Japan’s Nuclear Safety Regulations, MAINICHI
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This is but one example of the regulatory staff relying upon the technical
expertise of those involved in the industry itself.
D. Japan’s Nuclear Future
Despite Japan’s problems with the nuclear industry, nuclear power
will likely remain an important component of Japan’s energy future. The
island nation lacks resources such as crude oil and has to import over
eighty percent of its required energy.114 Japan has been aggressively pro-
moting the industry since 1973,115 is one of the few nations in the world to
have a full-fuel cycle system in place, and has fifty main reactors, which
supply over thirty percent of the nation’s electricity.116 The government
had planned to increase the nuclear energy’s share of the entire electrical
generation industry,117 but in the wake of Fukushima support for nuclear
energy has shrunk dramatically among the Japanese population.118
In response, former Prime Minister Naoto Kan called for a new en-
ergy policy that is less reliant on nuclear power.119 However, past problems
SHIMBUN (Nov. 5, 2011), available in English at http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php
?article23463.
114 Nuclear Power in Japan, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOC., http://www.world-nuclear.org/info
/inf79.html (last updated Jan. 2013).
115 Id. The Economist notes that nuclear power continues to offer significant advantages
in that it offers “reliable power, a degree of energy security, and no carbon dioxide
emissions . . . . In terms of lives lost, it has also boasted, to date, a reasonably good
record.” Japan’s Hydra-Headed Disaster: The Fallout, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 17, 2011),
available at http://www.economist.com/node/18395981.
116 Nuclear Power in Japan, supra note 114.
117 See id.
118 According to Gavin Blair, “more than 80 percent of Japanese now say they are anti-
nuclear [sic] and distrust government information on radiation.” Gavin Blair, Beginning
of the End for Nuclear Power in Japan?, CSMONITOR (June 20, 2011), http://www
.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2011/0620/Beginning-of-the-end-for-nuclear-power-in
-Japan. Some polls conducted in the aftermath showed that “between 41 and 54 percent
of Japanese support scrapping, or reducing the numbers of, nuclear power plants.” M. V.
Ramana, Nuclear Power and the Public, 67 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 1, 43 (July 2011).
In September 2011, thousands marched on central Tokyo to protest nuclear power and
urge the government to abandon the industry. Thousands March Against Nuclear Power
in Tokyo, USA TODAY (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011
-09-19/japan-anti-nuclear-protest/50461872/1.
119 Ramana, supra note 118, at 44. In September, the Prime Minister announced a plan
to make the country nuclear free by 2030 by halting construction of new plants, setting
a forty year limit on existing plants, and establishing tough new safety standards to be set
by a new regulatory agency. Carol J. Williams, In Wake of Fukushima Disaster, Japan
to End Nuclear Power by 2030s, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2012), http://latimesblogs.latimes
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have not yielded long-term commitments to reducing the nation’s de-
pendence on nuclear energy, as officials have recognized that the nuclear
program “must continue because Japan does not have sufficient natural
resources to do without it.”120 Though the Energy and Environment Council
decided to reduce Japan’s dependence on nuclear power,121 it remains un-
clear how they expect to do so while still meeting carbon emission reduc-
tion goals and increased energy independence.
E. The American Nuclear Regulatory System
The American relationship with the peaceful atom began after the
Second World War with the passage of the United States Atomic Energy
Act of 1946.122 This Act established the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
(“USAEC”) to both foster and control the peacetime development of nuclear
energy.123 Congress decided to divide the USAEC into two separate agen-
cies in the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974124 in order to separate the
regulatory and licensing functions of the USAEC from its other duties.125
The research and development, nuclear weapons, and naval reactor pro-
grams of the USAEC were given to the newly created Energy Research
and Development Administration (“ERDA”),126 while the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission (“NRC”) was given the authority to regulate and inspect
the commercial nuclear power industry.127 ERDA was combined with the
Department of Energy in 1977,128 but the NRC remains the commercial
regulator of nuclear energy, overseeing safety, security, reactor licensing
and renewal, and spent fuel management.129
.com/world_now/2012/09/in-wake-of-fukushima-disaster-japan-to-end-nuclear-power-by
-2030s.html.
120 Japan Takes Stock after Tokaimura Nuclear Accident, CNN (Oct. 2, 1999), http://cnn
.com/ASIANOW/east/9910/01/japan.nuclear.02/ (summarizing statement by Chief Cabinet
Secretary Hiromu Nonaka).
121 Nuclear Power in Japan, supra note 114.
122 Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2297 (2006).
123 The Atomic Energy Act states that it is the role of the Commission to take necessary
measures in order to fulfill the overarching purpose of the Act: “to promote world peace,
improve the general welfare, increase the standard of living, and strengthen free compe-
tition in private enterprise.” See id. §§ 2011, 2304(a), 2305.
124 Id. §§ 5801–5891 (2006).
125 Id. § 5801(c).
126 Id. § 5801(b).
127 Id. § 5841.
128 Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7112 (2006).
129 About Us: History, NRC, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/history.html#nrctoday (last
updated Dec. 18, 2012).
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The NRC has been criticized, like the Japanese nuclear regulators,
for being too close to the industry. In 1987, a congressional report stated
that the NRC “has not maintained an arms length regulatory posture with
the commercial nuclear power industry.”130 More recently, the Commission
has been criticized by then–Presidential nominee Barack Obama for being
“captive of the industries that it regulates.”131 Just days after Fukushima,
the Union of Concerned Scientists released a highly critical report about
the 2010 NRC performance,132 while Reuters reported that the Commission
had become an international lobbyist for American manufacturers like
Westinghouse, “raising concerns about a potential conflict of interest.”133
While the nuclear industry has a fairly good safety record compared
to other industries,134 there have been some incidents. The first occurred
in 1959, when the Santa Susana Field Laboratory’s Sodium Reactor
Experiment, located in southern California, experienced a partial core
meltdown.135 Another explosion occurred in 1961 at the small test reactor
Stationary Low-Power Reactor Number One in Idaho,136 and a partial
meltdown at the Enrico Fermi Nuclear Generating Station in Michigan
occurred five years later.137
However, the most serious accident occurred at Three Mile Island,
Pennsylvania in 1979.138 This incident began when a non-nuclear second-
ary system failed, which caused a failure in a primary-system relief valve,
130 STAFF OF H. SUBCOMM. ON GENERAL OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 100TH CONG.,
NRC COZINESS WITH INDUSTRY: NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FAILS TO MAINTAIN
ARMS LENGTH RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 3 (Dec. 1987).
131 Justin Elliott, Ex-Regulator Flacking for Pro-Nuke Lobby, SALON.COM (Mar. 17, 2011),
http://www.salon.com/2011/03/18/jeff_merrifield_nuclear_energy_institute/.
132 Jia Lynn Yang, Democrats Step Up Pressure on Nuclear Regulators Over Disaster
Preparedness, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business
/economy/democrats-step-up-pressure-on-nuclear-regulators-over-disaster-preparedness
/2011/03/17/ABLd66n_story.html.
133 Ben Berkowitz & Roberta Rampton, Exclusive: U.S. Nuclear Regulator a Policeman
or Salesman?, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/18/us
-nuclear-industry-nrc-idUSTRE73H0PL20110418.
134 Charles Fergus, Are Today’s Nuclear Power Plants Safe?, RESEARCH PENN STATE (Feb. 19,
2007), http://news.psu.edu/story/141290/2007/02/19/research/probing-question-are-todays
-nuclear-power-plants-safe.
135 SANTA SUSANA FIELD LABORATORY ADVISORY PANEL, REPORT 10 (Oct. 2006), available
at http://www.ssflpanel.org/files/SSFLPanelReport.pdf.
136 SUSAN M. STACY, IDAHO OPERATIONS OFF., DEP’T OF ENERGY, PROVING THE PRINCIPLE
138–50 (2000).
137 Fermi, Unit 1, NRC, http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/decommissioning/power-reactor
/enrico-fermi-atomic-power-plant-unit-1.html (last updated Mar. 29, 2012).
138 Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident, NRC (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.nrc
.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html.
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releasing a large amount of reactor coolant.139 As the operator General
Public Utilities and the NRC attempted to control the melting reactor, the
regulator allowed the release of 40,000 gallons of radioactive waste in the
Susquehanna River.140 The incident was rated a five on the seven-point
INES.141 Concerns over the safety of the plants, the regulatory capability
of the NRC, and the confusing state of communications142 forced the NRC
to tighten its safety controls.143
The future of nuclear power in the United States remains unclear.
Currently, there are 104 commercial reactors producing nearly twenty per-
cent of the nation’s total electric energy, making the United States the
world’s largest supplier of commercial nuclear energy.144 However, demand
for nuclear construction has slowed over the last few decades since Three
Mile Island.145 Construction on all of the current 104 reactors began before
1974.146 Popular support for the industry has dwindled, with recent polls
showing just sixty-two percent of the population in favor of the use of
nuclear energy.147 Critics point to the lukewarm reception of the industry
in the past forty years as a sign that the industry lacks a significant future
in the United States.148 Others point to increasing cost as a sign that the
industry is not competitive enough to survive in the American energy mar-
ket.149 Proponents respond by claiming that the industry can be effective
139 Id.
140 PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND, THE NEED FOR
CHANGE: THE LEGACY OF TMI 114–15 (Oct. 1979), available at http://www.threemileisland
.org/downloads/188.pdf.
141 See IAEA, INES: THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EVENT SCALE
(2008), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/ines.pdf.
142 Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident, supra note 138.
143 Charles Komanoff, Reflections on the U.S. Nuclear Industry’s 25 Lean Years, 11
SYNTHESIS & REGENERATION (Jan./Feb. 1991), available at http://www.greens.org/s-r
/11/11-07.html.
144 Nuclear Power in the USA, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOC., http://www.world-nuclear.org
/info/inf41.html (last updated Feb. 2013).
145 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2010 282–83 (Oct. 19, 2011),
available at http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/archive/038410.pdf.
146 Matthew L. Wald, Nuclear ‘Renaissance’ Is Short on Largess, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2010),
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/nuclear-renaissance-is-short-on-largess/.
147 Americans’ Support for Nuclear Energy Holds at Majority Level 6 Months After Japan
Accident, PR NEWSWIRE (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/americans
-support-for-nuclear-energy-holds-at-majority-level-6-months-after-japan-accident-13098
1293.html.
148 AMORY B. LOVINS ET AL., NUCLEAR POWER: CLIMATE FIX OR FOLLY 10 (2009), available
at http://www.rmi.org/Knowledge-Center/Library/E09-01_NuclearPowerClimateFixOrFolly.
149 Thomas B. Cochran, The Future Role of Nuclear Power in the United States, NATURAL
RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Apr. 15, 2004), http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/pnucpwr.asp.
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when combined with other renewable sources to constitute a viable eco-
nomic and environmental alternative to fossil fuels.150 Either way, the de-
bate has not reached a decisive conclusion. In December 2011, Southern
Company began construction of two new nuclear facilities to be completed
by 2017,151 and the Obama administration continues to express support
for nuclear power in the United States.152
II. INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR REGULATION
Nuclear energy may be potentially dangerous, but it does offer
some long-term economic and environmental benefits. Not only does nu-
clear energy help resource-poor countries like Japan meet their energy
needs independently,153 but it also provides a renewable energy source
that does not contribute to the carbon dioxide emissions blamed for global
warming.154 However, the accident at Chernobyl taught the world that
nuclear energy can have transboundary risks.155 National governments,
as shown in the previous section, are already struggling to maintain high
levels of safety through their own regulatory regimes.
International cooperation would allow states to address safety prob-
lems that unilateral regulation could not effectively tackle,156 while pro-
moting common standards across countries.157 These benefits emphasize
150 MASS. INST. OF TECH., UPDATE OF THE MIT 2003 FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY M.I.T. STUDY (2009), available at http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower
/pdf/nuclearpower-update2009.pdf.
151 The Plan, SOUTHERN CO., http://www.southerncompany.com/nuclearenergy/plan.aspx
(last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
152 See Julie Ann McKellogg, U.S. Nuclear Renaissance Further Crippled by Japan Crisis,
VOICE OF AMERICA (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.voanews.com/english/news/usa/US-Nuclear
-Renaissance-Further-Crippled-by-Japan-Crisis-118272249.html.
153 Brynhildsen, supra note 72, at 248–49.
154 Mohamed ElBaradei, Address at the European Nuclear Congress: International
Cooperation and the Future of Nuclear Power (Oct. 28, 1998); Factsheets and FAQs:
Atomic Energy and the Environment, IAEA, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets
/English/environment.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
155 Ellen B. Moynagh, The Legacy of Chernobyl: Its Significance for the Ukraine and the
World, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 709, 709–10 (1994); Melanie L. Oxhorn, The Norms of
Nuclear Accidents After Chernobyl, 8 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 375, 376 (1993).
156 Jacob Katz Cogan, The Regulatory Turn in International Law, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 321,
360 (2011).
157 The International Atomic Energy Agency already functions in this capacity. McMillan,
supra note 24, at 990. The next section of this Note will discuss how the agency can be
strengthened in order to more effectively regulate and create common standards and
practices. See infra Part III.C.
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the importance of a strong international nuclear regulatory scheme.158
Since Chernobyl, the international community has taken steps to set up
such a system in order to “shore up and back up states that are thought
to be failing in their regulatory responsibilities in critical sectors and to en-
hance, as well, the capacities of other, more capable states in this regard.”159
This section will examine the current international nuclear energy regu-
latory regime and how it addresses nuclear safety.
A. The IAEA Mandate
While there are several organizations that deal with nuclear issues
on a regional or international level, it is the IAEA that is the largest and
most influential.160 The IAEA is also one of the most prominent agencies
in the area of technology and nuclear safety.161 The agency was created by
the United Nations in 1957 in order to monitor and supervise the develop-
ment of peaceful nuclear energy.162 The stated safety objectives of the IAEA
include the exchange of information and technology, the establishment
of safety standards, and the provision of technical assistance to member
states and developing countries.163 To provide this assistance, the agency
operates a reporting system, site inspections, and the provision of equip-
ment or safety services.164 The IAEA may only implement safety standards
upon states that have agreed to receive these services, but it may refuse
158 It is important to note that a stronger international regulatory scheme would not wholly
supplant the states, only that such a system could aid states in many ways, such as by
helping to facilitate stronger domestic regulation, providing a voice for domestic public
powers on a larger stage, and creating more uniformity among safety standards. Sabino
Cassese, Administrative Law Without the State? The Challenge of Global Regulation, 37
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 663, 677 (2005); Cogan, supra note 156, at 325.
159 Cogan, supra note 156, at 330.
160 The IAEA is one of several major nuclear agencies, including the European Atomic
Energy Community, the Organization for European Cooperation’s European Nuclear
Energy Agency, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the
Inter-American Nuclear Commission, the Arab Atomic Energy Agency, the Brazilian-
Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, the World Asso-
ciation of Nuclear Operators, the OECD/Nuclear Energy Agency, the G-24 Nuclear Safety
Coordination, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. McMillan,
supra note 24, at 989.
161 Id.
162 About the IAEA, IAEA, http://www.iaea.org/About/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
163 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 23, 1956, art. II (entered into
force July 29, 1957).
164 Id. art. III.
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to provide them to a recalcitrant member state.165 Its most important role,
however, is as a forum for the formulation of shared international safety
standards, practices, and principles.166 This role is best exemplified by the
creation of the five multilateral conventions regarding nuclear safety: the
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident,167 the Conven-
tion on Assistance in the Event of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency,168 the 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage,169 the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear
Damage,170 and the Convention on Nuclear Safety.171
B. Convention on Nuclear Safety
Of these Conventions, the last is the most significant in terms of
improving the safe operation of nuclear installations, as it commits all
member states to legally binding general principles of nuclear safety.172
This obligation means that member states must ensure that appropriate
procedures relating to siting, design, construction, and operation of nuclear
power plants are established and implemented through a legislative and
regulatory framework.173 In addition, the Convention contains a provision
165 Id.
166 See McMillan, supra note 24, at 989.
167 International Atomic Energy Agency, Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear
Accident, Sept. 26, 1986, 1439 U.N.T.S. 275 [hereinafter Convention on Early Notification],
available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc335.shtml.
168 International Atomic Energy Agency, Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear
Accident or Radiological Emergency, Sept. 26, 1986, 1457 U.N.T.S. 133 (1987).
169 International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage, May 21, 1963, as amended by the Protocol from the IAEA Convention on Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage, Sept. 12, 1997, available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD
/publications/PDF/Pub1279_web.pdf.
170 International Atomic Energy Agency, Convention on Supplementary Compensation
for Nuclear Damage, Sept. 29, 1997, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/567 (1998), available at http://
www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc567.pdf.
171 International Atomic Energy Agency, Convention on Nuclear Safety, Sept. 29, 1994,
IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/449, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs
/Others/inf449.shtml.
172 Id. pmbl. § viii.
173 Id. art. 7, 17–19; see McMillan, supra note 24, at 993; see also Brian McGill, Developments
in Nuclear Safety & Waste Disposal, 7 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 889 (1995); John L.
Woodward, Comparative Aspects of the French & German Nuclear Energy Regimes: Work-
ing Toward an International Legal Framework, 16 DICK. J. INT’L L. 691, 721 (1998); Sayed
Zeidan, The Procedural Rules and Obligations Under International Law for Construction
of a Nuclear Installation: Prevention and Reduction of Environmental Damage, 23 GEO.
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 263, 264 (2011).
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for scheduled signatory meetings where each member state submits a
self-created compliance report to be reviewed by the other members.174
However, the Convention does not require uniform international safety
standards, and contains no provisions allowing the IAEA to enforce its
standards with sanctions.175 Even though it lacks enforcement capability,
the IAEA has “established a series of safety standards which promulgate
the best technology and practices in an understandable and accessible
fashion.”176 These standards are binding once the member state has re-
ceived assistance from the IAEA by requesting the agency’s services or the
use of its standards.177 Once the state has done so, it is bound by the stan-
dards regardless of the amount of assistance provided by the IAEA, just
as the agency is bound by them in providing its services.178
C. Peer Review
One of the most important elements of the international nuclear
safety regime overseen by the IAEA through its conventions is the em-
phasis on peer review and state sovereignty. The Convention on Nuclear
Safety states that it is the state with jurisdiction over a nuclear installa-
tion that has the ultimate responsibility for safety.179 The nuclear regime
thus focuses on the promotion of domestic implementation of international
safety standards through their incorporation into national regulation and
legislation.180 The IAEA is tasked not with imposing safety standards, but
with complementing state efforts by making norms and creating uniform
safety policies.181 It is through the peer-process system that the interna-
tional community monitors state compliance with safety standards,182 a
method chosen due to the reality that, despite the recent expansion of
174 See Convention on Nuclear Safety, supra note 171, at art. 20.
175 Id.; see David R. Marples & Tatyana E. Cerullo, International Nuclear Safety: The
Case of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station, 24 VT. L. REV. 1209, 1222 (2000).
176 McMillan, supra note 24, at 995. These standards are created by the Advisory
Commission on Safety Standards and the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group,
which prepare reports on nuclear safety and set out general safety recommendations. Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Convention on Nuclear Safety, supra note 171, at pmbl. iii. For more discussion of a
state’s responsibilities vis-à-vis nuclear safety, particularly during siting and construction,
see Zeidan, supra note 173, at 265–67.
180 Monica J. Washington, The Practice of Peer Review in the International Nuclear Safety
Regime, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 430, 435 (1997).
181 Id. at 435.
182 Id. at 430.
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international regulatory regimes,183 “states continue to resist significant
intrusions upon their sovereignty in the area of nuclear safety.”184 States
prefer to keep safety controls in their own borders, mainly though national
legislation, the granting, amendment, extension, or renewal of operating
licenses, or through national regulatory bodies.185 Under a peer review
system, the cost of noncompliance is raised through peer pressure and
public scrutiny, not through legal compulsion.186
The peer review process can be complex, time consuming, and ex-
pensive both for the IAEA and the state. It begins with the member state
making a request to the IAEA concerning a particular facility, and then
the preparatory meeting with the regulator and plant management.187
Next, technical, independent experts are recruited, usually by the IAEA,188
and tests of the facility occur, usually building on self-assessment reviews
conducted by the plant prior to their arrival.189 The international experts
carry out on-site evaluations of the facility and compare the domestic regu-
lations against the international standards.190 A final report containing
recommendations and findings will be issued by the experts, but the final
decision about how to respond to their reports is left to the member state.191
In addition to this reporting process, states are also required by
the Convention on Nuclear Safety to submit reports on the measures they
are taking to implement their treaty obligations and to hold meetings
with the other member states to evaluate their progress.192 A summary
report, available to the public, is adopted by consensus after each review
meeting.193 However, if a state is found not to be in compliance or a dis-
pute between states arises, the Convention does not provide for any re-
ferral of disputes to a permanent political or judicial body, preferring to
leave it up to the states themselves to resolve the dispute through amicable
183 See generally Cogan, supra note 156.
184 Washington, supra note 180, at 440.
185 Id. at 434 n. 11.
186 See id. at 446, 455.
187 See Measures to Strengthen International Co-Operation in Nuclear Safety, Radiological
Protection and Radioactive Waste Management, IAEA Doc. GC(39)/INF/8, para. 1 (Sept. 4,
1995); see also Washington, supra note 180, at 448.
188 Ferdinand L. Franzen, Reviewing the Operational Safety of Nuclear Power Plants,
NUCLEAR POWER & SAFETY, IAEA BULLETIN 4/1987, at 13 (1987).
189 Washington, supra note 180, at 448; Zeidan, supra note 173, at 315.
190 Zeidan, supra note 173, at 269–70.
191 Id. at 270.
192 Convention on Nuclear Safety, supra note 171, at art. 20.
193 Id. art. 25.
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settlement.194 This entire framework of peer review is meant to facilitate
the gradual phasing-in of international standards through a system of
incentives and accountability provided by other member states.195
Even though the peer review system does not have international
enforcement mechanisms and the IAEA cannot force states to comply
with its safety regulations, the process does have some benefits. States
remain reluctant to allow intrusions into their sovereignty, but technical
reviews are becoming “a more accepted and respected means of assisting
countries with their regulatory efforts.”196 Many states benefit from the
nonconfrontational environment, and the Convention on Nuclear Safety
has made inroads into the international nuclear safety culture not only
by requiring states to maintain high levels of safety, but also by laying the
foundations for even more international cooperation in the field.197 The
peer review process provides flexibility for states to match a country’s needs
and priorities to its regulations, allows for more information sharing be-
tween states, and still respects state sovereignty concerns.198 In addition,
peer review can also raise public confidence in nuclear power by boosting
the public opinion that nuclear energy is safely regulated, while the public
can lose confidence if it sees that a state is not living up to its obligations.199
However, the peer review process was not able to stop an accident
like Fukushima, despite its myriad of benefits, which suggests that there
is still room for improvement. When a state like Japan fails to properly
regulate and/or oversee its nuclear installations, the international system
as it stands is forced to rely on the disapproval of and retaliation by other
states. If this system breaks down, or other states fail to respond, then
the peer review process loses its effectiveness. The IAEA is left helpless
under the current system to ensure public safety if the states do not regu-
late themselves.
III. STRENGTHENING THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY SYSTEM
The current international nuclear regulatory scheme is inadequate,
allowing states like Japan to continue failing in their own regulatory duties.
Because of the inherent weakness of the international system, avoidable
194 Id. art. 29; Odette Jankowitsch, The Convention on Nuclear Safety, NUCLEAR L. BULL.
NO. 54 (OECD, Paris, France), Dec. 1994, at 18.
195 Washington, supra note 180, at 459–60.
196 Id. at 460.
197 Id. at 461.
198 Id. at 461.
199 Id. at 462.
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accidents like the one that occurred at Fukushima are not avoided. This
section will discuss these systemic weaknesses and how they can be over-
come. First, it will argue for increased transparency on a national level.
Then, it will examine how the peer process and finally the IAEA can be
strengthened in order to provide for a more efficient and effective inter-
national regulatory system.
A. Increased Transparency on the National Level
1. The Benefits of Transparency
There are some things that the states can do to increase general
nuclear safety, and increased safety on a national level will increase safety
on a global level as well. The Fukushima disaster and Japan’s rather bleak
nuclear record teach us that increased transparency can go a long way to
reducing the severity and frequency of nuclear incidents, as well as to pro-
mote public knowledge and support of the industry. According to Kazuko
Hamada of the Japanese Atomic Energy Agency Policy Research Office,
many are concerned about nuclear operational safety, nuclear energy’s
impact on the environment, and nuclear proliferation.200 Hamada notes
that “transparency measures offer potential ways to address these con-
cerns, by sharing the information relevant to nuclear energy use and show-
ing the willingness to ensure that the increase in nuclear energy use does
not risk operational safety, the environment, or nuclear proliferation.”201
Public participation can provide valuable health and safety over-
sight of both regulators and plant operators, ensuring that practices like
amakudari, lax safety enforcement, and failed compliance do not go
unnoticed.202 The American Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board
recognized the importance of public participation in ensuring nuclear
safety, stating:
Our own experience . . . teaches that the generalization
[that public participation does not contribute to safety] has
no foundation in fact. Public participation . . . not only “can
200 Kazuko Hamada, Transparency and Nonproliferation in the Asia-Pacific Region:
Enhancing Transparency, Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime, 50 PROGRESS IN
NUCLEAR ENERGY 660, 660 (2008), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science
/article/pii/S0149197007002120.
201 Id.
202 JEAN-RENÉ JUBIN, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, TRANSPARENCY AND OPENNESS 7
(2011), available at http://www.ansn.org/Common/Topics/OpenTopic.aspx?ID=9087.
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provide valuable assistance to the adjudicatory process,”
but on frequent occasions demonstrably has done so . . .
[and] many of the substantial safety and environmental
issues which have received the scrutiny of licensing boards
were raised in the first instance by the intervenor.203
Jean-René Jubin of the IAEA Department of Nuclear Safety and Security
stressed that public involvement at all stages of nuclear construction and
operation strengthened safety structures by increasing public scrutiny
of safety performance by regulators and operators.204 A 2006 report by the
International Nuclear Safety Group states that “stakeholder involvement
makes regulatory organizations and other authorities acutely aware that
their actions are under public scrutiny [and] [t]ransparency increases the
motivation of individuals and institutions to meet their responsibilities . . .
[which] may result in more practical, relevant and coordinated adminis-
trative, technical and socially responsible decisions on safety issues.”205
The same report makes a similar observation about the influence of public
oversight on plant operators, as it would incentivize a high level of safety
performance by the operator.206 Public participation could help build
institutions that are more accountable, prompting stricter adherence to
safety standards.207
While Japan may require the use of nuclear energy in the long run,
it faces the challenge of dwindling popular support for the industry at
home. Transparency measures and efforts to inform the populace about
the safety and operation of nuclear facilities could help Japan drum up in-
creased public support and endorsement.208 IAEA Director General Yukiya
Amano stated in his address to the Review Meeting of the Contracting
Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety that “[r]igorous adherence
203 Anthony Roisman et al., Regulating Nuclear Power in the New Millennium, 26 PACE
ENVTL. L.J. 317, 328 (2009) (citing In the Matter of Gulf States Utilities Company (River
Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-183, Docket Nos. 50-458 and 50-459, 7 A.E.C. 222,
227–28 (Mar. 12, 1974)).
204 JUBIN, supra note 202, at 7.
205 INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY GROUP, IAEA, STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT IN
NUCLEAR ISSUES 3 (2006) [hereinafter STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT].
206 Id. at 3.
207 Japan’s Hydra-Headed Disaster, supra note 115; Svitlana Kravchenko, Is Access to Envi-
ronmental Information a Fundamental Human Right?, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L. 227, 228 (2009).
208 SECTION FOR TRANSPORT, ENERGY, INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE INFORMATION SOCIETY,
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE, GREATER TRANSPARENCY IN NUCLEAR
ENERGY—THE EESC IN ACTION 3 (2009), available at http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources
/docs/eesc-2009-19-en.pdf; STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT, supra note 205, at 3.
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to the most robust international safety standards and full transparency,
in good times and bad, are vital for restoring and maintaining public con-
fidence in nuclear power.”209 A study conducted by Eiji Yamamura showed
that while public support for nuclear energy declined after Fukushima,
transparency measures increased these rates.210 Public confidence can
be gained through a long-standing, demonstrated commitment to public
safety, which can then lead to increased credibility for nuclear operators
and regulators, a foundation for a successful nuclear program.211 Trans-
parency is thus integral to the creation and maintenance of any national
nuclear program.
2. The International Duty to Inform
In addition to the practical benefits of increased transparency, the
public is entitled to timely, accurate, and complete information about nu-
clear facilities and accidents.212 The duty a state has to inform the public
is an established principle of international law, though that duty is most
often framed in state-to-state terms.213 This duty as it applies to nuclear
energy is outlined in part by the Convention on Early Notification of a
Nuclear Accident (“Convention”), spearheaded by the IAEA and adopted
by consensus at Vienna, Austria on September 26, 1986 following the
Chernobyl disaster.214 The Convention requires that member states notify
possible affected states and the IAEA of nuclear accidents and to provide
updated information relevant to minimizing its consequences.215 Under a
related convention, the state with jurisdiction over the nuclear installation
209 Nuclear Safety Convention Review Meeting Convenes in Vienna, IAEA (2011), http://
www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/safety_convention.html.
210 Eiji Yamamura, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, SEINAN GAKUIN UNIVERSITY, Effect of
Transparency on Changing Views Regarding Nuclear Energy Before and After Japan’s
2011 Natural Disasters: A Cross-Country Analysis (2011), available at http://mpra.ub.uni
-muenchen.de/30954/1/MPRA_paper_30954.pdf.
211 STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT, supra note 205, at 5.
212 See id. at 1; JUBIN, supra note 202, at 4.
213 See Daniel G. Partan, The “Duty to Inform” in International Environmental Law, 6
B.U. INT’L L.J. 43, 44 (1988).
214 Convention on Early Notification, supra note 167. For more information on the
Chernobyl disaster and its effect on international law, see Devereaux F. McClatchey,
Chernobyl and Sandoz One Decade Later: The Evolution of State Responsibility for
International Disasters, 1986–1996, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 659 (1996); Oxhorn, supra
note 155.
215 Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 641, 646–47 (1987).
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must also “establish and maintain effective defenses in nuclear installa-
tion against potential radiological hazards,”216 as they are charged with
maintaining the safety of the facility.217
However, these treaties only address those incidents that have
actual or potential transboundary effects218 and only obliges the state to
inform other states and the IAEA, as it includes no provisions discussing
the state’s obligations toward its own people.219 General international
law extends this responsibility to any person or entity “which is empow-
ered by the law of that [s]tate to exercise elements of the governmental
authority . . . even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions.”220
This would include the operator of the nuclear installation and government
officials charged with ensuring nuclear safety.
Even though the Convention does not place a duty on a state or
its actors to inform the public of nuclear incidents or safety problems,
international law does recognize a fundamental human right to access en-
vironmental information. According to Svitlana Kravchenko, a Professor
at the University of Oregon, this right is based in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, Article 19’s protection of freedom of opinion and ex-
pression, including the freedom to “seek, receive and impart information
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”221 According to
Kravchenko, this right translates into a right of wide access to information,
subject only to limited exceptions,222 where individuals have the ability to
request and receive information from government and private entities
acting under government authority or jurisdiction.223 She argues that,
216 Convention on Nuclear Safety, supra note 171, at art. 1(ii).
217 Id. pmbl. iii.
218 Id. art. 2(1).
219 ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 84–85 (3d ed.
2004). The Convention only addresses a state’s duty to “ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” Conference on Environment and Development,
Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development, vol. I, Principle 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/REV.1 (Vol. I) (Jan. 1, 1993).
220 Resolution on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res.
56/83, arts. 5, 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002).
221 Kravchenko, supra note 207, at 229 (quoting Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A, art 19., U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10,
1948)). She also argues that this right is based in multiple human rights treaties and
declarations, international environmental agreements, and national legislation and
constitutions. Id. at 229–37.
222 Id. at 245–52 (detailing exceptions).
223 Id. at 239–45.
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because this right is so widely recognized throughout the international
community, it has become a universal human right and that states are
thus obliged to guarantee the full exercise of that right.224 In this case,
each and every state must make efforts to positively inform even its own
population of nuclear safety and operational incidents, or it will be in vio-
lation of international law.225
3. Improving Japanese Transparency
The Japanese nuclear power licensing system does take into
account public opinion in an effort to increase transparency. According
to the Citizen’s Nuclear Information Center, Japan has included public
involvement requirements and information disclosure as specified by law,
by agreement between power companies and local authorities, and as
customary practice.226 The report explains that the process begins when
the electric power company seeks local agreement from the mayor, the
prefectural governor, and the municipal and prefectural assemblies.227
Public involvement at this stage is limited to petitioning the local author-
ities and attending explanatory meetings.228
The formal licensing and environmental assessment stage calls for
public involvement as mandated by law only twice, both during the con-
struction application and siting phase. The first opportunity is at a public
hearing where the power company explains its plan and chosen residents
may present their opinions, and the second at another public hearing where
METI explains the result of the NISA safety assessment.229 Throughout
this process, the information available to the public is limited to simple ex-
planatory material, with no explanations of safety, radioactivity, or other
224 Id. at 237–38 (quoting Organization of American States, Inter-Am. Juridical Comm.,
Principles on the Right of Access to Information, OAS/Ser. Q CJ1/Res 147 (LXXIII-O/08)
(Aug. 7, 2008)).
225 For an example of how the Unites States has judicially interpreted and incorporated
this duty to inform within its own regulations governing the standard of care owed by a
nuclear facility operator to the surrounding population, see Jason Bjorn Aamodt, Comment,
Regulating the Standard of Care Owed to the Public During an Emergency at a Nuclear
Power Plant, 16 ENERGY L.J. 181 (1995).
226 Baku Nishio, Public Involvement in Japan’s Nuclear Power Licensing System, CITIZEN’S
NUCLEAR INFO. CTR., http://cnic.jp/english/newsletter/nit135/nit135articles/licensing.html
(last visited March 24, 2013).
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.
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similar concerns unique to nuclear power.230 This information is released
only after the environmental assessment is completed, but by this time it
is very difficult to stop the construction of a nuclear facility.231
In order to increase transparency, Japan must introduce more
inclusive, unbiased, and periodic public hearings and dialogues.232 Public
hearings are meant to inform any potential stakeholders and the media
about facilities, their activities, and safety regulations.233 It is important
for the public to be involved throughout the entirety of the process, from
licensing to the creation and implementation of the emergency plan.234
Under the Japanese system, involvement ends once the license has been
awarded, depriving the public of the opportunity to truly convey their
issues and concerns and to obtain answers.235 The government should cod-
ify these hearings with legislation236 that clearly outlines not only the pro-
cedure for public involvement, but also the process for decision-making,
and the expected level of involvement, the balanced representation of stake-
holders, scheduled venues and times for meetings, and the provision of
any resources the stakeholders may need in order to participate.237 No
matter the content of this legislation, making it clear and accessible to
the public would go a long way toward meaningfully involving all sectors
of the interested community. As it stands, the legal requirements for public
involvement are unclear and leave companies and local authorities in the
dark about how to conduct these hearings, leaving them to devolve into
simple explanatory meetings.
The hearings should not be merely attempts to inform the public of
decisions made without their input, but should be two-way dialogues that
include direct interaction between stakeholders and decision-makers.238
The Japanese hearings do allow residents to state their concerns, and
government, company, and local officials often directly respond to these
concerns, but they do so while providing very few details about the environ-
mental and regional impact.239 In addition, the current Japanese system
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 See JUBIN, supra note 202, at 24.
233 Id. at 23.
234 STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT, supra note 205, at 13.
235 Shorrock, supra note 62.
236 STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT, supra note 205, at 8–9.
237 Id. at 11; JUBIN, supra note 202, at 28.
238 JUBIN, supra note 202, at 27; STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT, supra note 205, at 4.
239 Nishio, supra note 226.
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does not allow any formal involvement by those outside the locality in
which the facility is to be built.240
The hearing process is meant to provide the public with all the in-
formation it needs to make an informed and confident decision about nu-
clear energy and safety, not only in their own community, but throughout
the country.241 To this end, all information that can be reasonably pro-
vided should be made available to the public, including information on any
potentially harmful consequence of normal operation, abnormal events
and their consequences, and emergency procedures, inspection results, and
the probabilities of any accidents.242 In addition, hearings should inform
the public of the objective benefits of nuclear energy and any successful
operations.243 However, the Japanese government often emphasizes these
benefits in order to allay fears concerning radioactivity, while downplaying
any negatives or regulatory failings.244
This same information should also be provided regularly to the
public through the media and issuances by the regulating authority and/or
the government. As the IAEA states, all information should be accurate
and complete, while any restrictions should be explained to the public as
much as possible without revealing any confidential or potentially danger-
ous information.245 The media and the internet can be used to ensure that
the public has easy access to all relevant and comprehensive information.246
It is especially important to provide information to all educators in order
to foster general understanding among all segments of the population from
an early age.247 Widely representative surveys should be taken regularly
in order to establish the actual concerns of the public, their level of interest
and support for nuclear energy, and any misinformation that may need to
be corrected.248
Finally, all steps should be taken to ensure not only that regula-
tory bodies remain independent of the government or any nuclear energy
promotion bodies,249 but that any information they provide to the public 
240 Id.
241 See STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT, supra note 205, at 6.
242 Id. at 4, 9.
243 Id. at 5.
244 Shorrock, supra note 62.
245 JUBIN, supra note 202, at 11; STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT, supra note 205, at 6.
246 STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT, supra note 205, at 5.
247 Id. at 4.
248 Id. at 5.
249 For further information concerning the independence of Japanese regulators from the
government and nuclear energy promotion institutions, see the discussion of amakudari
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also remains objective and unbiased. The process of public dialogue should
be open and inclusive, avoiding any attempts to use emotional reasoning,
dogmatism, or complicated or incomprehensible expert information.250
Only a “high level of safety demonstrated continuously over time” can build
public confidence and trust.251 It is the role of the regulator to ensure the
safety of the public, and it can best assure this through its open and trans-
parent participation throughout all stages of the licensing, construction,
and operation of nuclear facilities. The Japanese licensing procedure cre-
ates a system where “public hearings and public comment processes tend
to be proforma [sic] in nature,” and many in Japan are dissatisfied with
their opportunities for involvement.252
4. Improving American Transparency
While Japan has a long way to go to introduce greater transpar-
ency into its nuclear regulatory system, it is not the only state that could
allow for greater public participation and transparency. The American
NRC has systematically reduced the opportunity for public participation
in the licensing process out of the fear that an uninformed and irrational
public would only slow the licensing process.253 Under the previous system
of the first great age of nuclear power, the USAEC encouraged the “limited
above. See supra notes 101–08 and accompanying text. The industry minister of Japan,
Banri Kaieda, announced his resignation and the separation of the NISA from the METI
in order to address the conflict between the promotion and regulation of the nuclear in-
dustry, but former industry ministry official and professor at the Graduate School of Media
Design at Keio University criticized the move as merely “cosmetic” and new appointments
are made from within the ministry in keeping with traditional Japanese administrative
practice. Tsuyoshi Inajima & Yuji Okada, Japan’s Industry Minister Kaieda to Step Down
After Nuclear Plant Disaster, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/2011-08-04/japan-s-industry-minister-to-step-down-after-nuclear-disaster.html. In fact,
there have been allegations that government and industry leaders collaborated to sway
opinion at public hearings by stacking the audience with nuclear industry supporters in
order to give the appearance that there was strong support for nuclear power. See id.;
Chester Dawson, Scandal Taints Japan Nuclear Sector, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904823804576499942442007306.html.
250 STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT, supra note 205, at 12.
251 Id. at 5.
252 See Nishio, supra note 226 (“We do not present the Japanese system as a model.
Japanese civil society groups are deeply dissatisfied with it in many ways.”); Shorrock,
supra note 62 (outlining some of the anti-nuclear protests since the 1980s, including a
1981 demonstration where 7,000 people protested against a hearing for a plant in Hamaoka).
253 Roisman et al., supra note 203, at 318 (2009).
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appearance” statement process, viewing it as “an opportunity for the gen-
eral public to express their views,” and receive explanations from industry
representatives as to why these concerns “were unfounded.”254 According
to Llewellyn King, a nuclear journalist, “[t]he idea was that this openness
would encourage the public to take a greater interest in nuclear science
and the civilian uses of nuclear [energy].”255 However, the industry soon
came to believe that it was “the NRC’s own vigorous examinations and
oversight, and the industry’s solid commitment to safety and security”
that guaranteed true nuclear safety.256 Public participation became a nec-
essary evil, best utilized as a simple public relations tool.257Over time, the
public has been squeezed out or disadvantaged by the nuclear regulators
and the industry.
In order for a plant to be built in the United States, all applicants
must first apply to the NRC, which will conduct hearings and investiga-
tions to determine whether or not it will approve the construction.258 The
application process is long, possibly taking many years, and requires the
applicant to submit lengthy and detailed documentation that have often
been found to be lacking sufficient detail and specifics as required by law.259
The public, during this period, is at a significant disadvantage. It has no
direct access to the applicant, no ability to question the applicant, limited
access to documents which the applicant has made public, and is impeded
by increasingly strict requirements regarding high burdens of production
and evidence.260 Due to hyper-technical NRC objections of minor infrac-
tions of these complicated regulations, many public objectors—specifically
those from Native American tribes—have been denied hearings.261
254 Id.
255 Llewellyn King, Why Nuclear Power Has Languished, N. STAR WRITERS GRP. (Sept. 30,
2008), http://004eeb5.netsolhost.com/lk066.htm.
256 Roisman et al., supra note 203, at 319.
257 Id. at 322.
258 Id. at 322.
259 See, e.g., In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear
Generating Units 2 and 3), New York State Notice of Intention to Participate and Petition
to Intervene, Docket Nos. 50-247-LR, 50-286-LR (Nov. 30, 2007).
260 10 C.F.R. § 2.309 (2008); see also Roisman et al., supra note 203, at 336–44; Citizens
Awareness Network v. United States, 391 F.3d 338 (1st Cir. 2004) (upholding these regu-
lations despite a challenge by a group of public interest groups claiming that these rules
were arbitrary and capricious).
261 See, e.g., In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee LLC (Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Station), CLI-07-13, Docket No. 50-271-LR (Mar. 15, 2007) (denying inter-
vention petition by Massachusetts Attorney General).
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Dale Klein, former chairman of the NRC, has emphasized the
importance of high safety standards and public participation in building
public confidence.262 This ignores the fact that many substantial safety
and environmental issues were first brought to the NRC’s attention by
intervenors from the public.263 Anthony Roisman argued that contrary to
popular NRC belief, the NRC record evidences anything but high safety
standards or their enforcement, pointing to recent lapses as proof that the
regulating authority wishes only to license plants more quickly, not more
safely.264 In addition, he argued that the nuclear industry itself has pri-
oritized profits over safety.265 According to Roisman,
At a minimum, such a drastic change in, and reduction of,
safety requirements should have been proceeded [sic] by
a thorough and publicly discussed analysis in the context
of an adjudicatory hearing that demonstrated: that nuclear
power had advanced sufficiently to be able to decisively
conclude that the plants that had already been licensed
were “safe” for their full term; that no important unresolved
safety problems existed; and, that the industry had reached
sufficient maturity to justify such a change. No such pub-
lic hearings have been held, and no such findings have
been made.266
These facts show that the American system, like the Japanese system,
was designed to discourage public participation, preferring to keep the
public in the dark and trusting the industry and the regulators them-
selves to ensure safety. In response, the public has lost confidence in nu-
clear power and its regulators, and this could lead to the end of the second
nuclear age.267
By redesigning the current system to remove the roadblocks to
meaningful public participation, the United States could improve not only
262 Dale E. Klein, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Remarks to the U.S.
Department of Commerce Nuclear Energy Summit: Promoting Public Confidence in
Nuclear Safety through High Standards (Oct. 8, 2008), available at pbadupws.nrc.gov
/docs/ML0828/ML082820479.pdf.
263 See In the Matter of Gulf States Utilities Company (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-183, Docket Nos. 50-458 and 50-459, 7 A.E.C. 222, 228 (Mar. 12, 1974).
264 Roisman et al., supra note 203, at 330–33.
265 Id. at 333–34.
266 Id. at 335.
267 Id. at 363.
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its safety record, but also public support for nuclear power. While there
have not been any major incidents in the United States since Three Mile
Island, safety is a moving target, and the NRC should be doing all it can
to maintain the highest standards of safety.
B. Promoting the Peer Review Process
There are several changes that can be made at the international
nuclear regulatory level in order to ensure greater compliance by states
with basic safety measures such as transparency. The current system
focuses quite heavily on the role of the states in policing themselves.268
It should further be encouraged for states to build on this sense of com-
munity. The IAEA should promote the idea that each state has a very real
stake in the safety of nuclear energy, as the threat from an accident can
cross boundaries. Joseph Rees suggests that the “force of peer expectations
works best in small face-to-face groups which stay together for long periods
of time,” and that “group solidarity (and therefore peer pressure) is most
likely to flourish under intimate conditions.”269 This suggests that represen-
tatives should be appointed for longer periods of time, and meetings should
take place in smaller groups in order to foster a more intimate setting.
In addition to these measures strengthening the peer review pro-
cess, it should be emphasized by the IAEA that states should not favor or
bias other states in order to ensure that each safety report is properly re-
viewed for compliance, as mandated by the peer review system. Increased
transparency measures could ensure that not only will states be fact check-
ing each other’s reports, but the public will as well.270 More independent
on-site visits by these state representatives could be conducted in order to
supplement self-assessments submitted by the states for peer review.271
However, it is unclear how states would respond to these double-checks on
their integrity and visits, particularly by representatives of other nations.
The independence of IAEA experts is crucial for many states, however,
because the pool of experts in nuclear energy is so small, “most know each
other, or know of each other,” and no nominated technical-safety expert has
ever been refused by the state concerned.272 The IAEA should be careful
to ensure that the experts remain independent and neutral, possibly by
268 See Jankowitsch, supra note 194, at 18.
269 JOSEPH V. REES, HOSTAGES OF EACH OTHER: THE TRANSFORMATION OF NUCLEAR
SAFETY SINCE THREE MILE ISLAND 91–92 (1994).
270 See Washington, supra note 180, at 464.
271 Id. at 463.
272 Id. at 449.
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hiring its own permanent pool of candidates who would therefore lack
allegiances to any one state or company.
C. A Stronger IAEA
A third important change to the current international nuclear regu-
latory system that should be made in the aftermath of Fukushima is to
strengthen the IAEA, the international nuclear watchdog. While the states
are and should remain the current major players in the international
system, there is potential for the IAEA to expand its role as a regulator.
In order to strengthen the IAEA, it must first be made clear to the world
that its regulations are to be taken seriously. Syria built a nuclear reactor
without informing the IAEA in advance, as is mandated under the inter-
national system.273 The IAEA focuses its attentions on declared sites rather
than on the detection of hidden activities, relying on states to be forthcom-
ing about their activities, but Syria showed the supreme lack of information
the IAEA possesses.274 The agency relies mainly on outside information,
which also weakens its independence.275 It seeks to remedy this by diver-
sifying its information sources, but the agency should focus on building
even wider connections—particularly with industry—as many facilities
are now privately owned and operated. As the Fukushima incident teaches
us, it is often the operator who has better access to information regarding
a facility than the state that regulates it.
In order to expand its role, the IAEA will also have to address its
funding. Currently, technical reviews are funded by both the member
states and the IAEA together, with industrial countries paying the full cost
of a review visit and developing countries paying only the local expenses.276
The IAEA share is funded by contributions, mainly from the United States,
Canada, the European Union, and Russia.277 These contributions are partly
voluntary and partly according to a scale fixed by the General Conference
in proportion to the U.N. funding scheme.278 In addition, the IAEA can bor-
row money.279 This irregular source of funding is a major weakness for
the IAEA. As a result, the agency is chronically underfunded, and if it is
273 Gregory L. Schulte, Strengthening the IAEA: How the Nuclear Watchdog Can Regain
Its Bark, 253 STRATEGIC FORUM 4 (Mar. 2010).
274 Id. at 4.
275 Id. at 7.
276 Washington, supra note 180, at 449.
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to expand its role, it will need more funds.280 In order to do this, the IAEA
should diversify the sources of its funding, revise its contribution scale,
and call on greater voluntary contributions.
For states that refuse to implement the safety standards, the IAEA
should be given greater enforcement power. Currently, the peer pressure
system provides only for the states to police themselves.281 If the IAEA
were given some enforcement power, international regulation would be
less hampered by the political maneuverings of states and become more
independent, securing even greater international safety.282 While trade
boycotts and political pressures could be effective disincentives, the with-
holding of safety assistance should never be allowed, as this would frus-
trate the IAEA’s principle mission.283 An enforcement body could also be
useful to the IAEA in order to resolve disputes between states and hear
public concerns when the states themselves fail to do so. While the IAEA
could conceivably use other courts from other international systems, such
as the International Court of Justice, it may be better for the IAEA statute
to incorporate an arbitration panel. This would allow the organization to
maintain the spirit of cooperation and congeniality between states that
prevails under the current system, but also allow for outside dispute reso-
lution when this fails.284 The way the system operates now, it is unclear
whether one can bring a claim against a state for a breach of its obliga-
tions regarding nuclear safety under public international law, and how one
would even bring such a claim, severely undercutting the IAEA’s power
to enforce its safety obligations if the other states do not.285
Finally, the IAEA should be given greater leeway to conduct in-
spections. Currently, this power is limited to agency projects and requests
by members, but independent inspections could contribute to higher levels
of safety.286 These inspections would not only review the equipment, man-
agement, and safety culture of the plants, but also the compliance of the
regulatory scheme with international standards, avoiding the pitfalls of
vague self-reports.287 States are already mandated to report their regulatory
280 McMillan, supra note 24, at 1008–09.
281 See Jankowitsch, supra note 194, at 18.
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efforts to the other states and the IAEA, but there is no assurance that
these self-assessments are full and accurate representations.288 There are
also no guarantees under the current system that they contain enough
detail for other states to review them for compliance or national regulators
to utilize them to improve safety.289 Increased inspections could fill in the
gaps, create a better picture, and ensure that these reports are reliable.
CONCLUSION
In 1986, the world was shocked by the devastating international
consequences of the nuclear accident at Chernobyl, prompting the interna-
tional community to adopt more stringent global safety standards via five
unprecedented Conventions on state responsibility and nuclear safety.290
This boom in international nuclear energy regulation mirrors the overall
regulatory turn in international law within the past two decades.291 This
Note recognizes that in advocating for a stronger global effort at regulating
nuclear energy, it must face the reality that states may not wish to create
such a system that could intrude upon their ability to regulate within their
own borders.292 There are many theories as to why states are sometimes
willing to concede their otherwise jealously guarded state sovereignty to an
international regime.293 However, as the regulatory boom after Chernobyl
has taught us, the world can be prompted to such action in the wake of an
incident that hammers home the truly international nature of nuclear
energy and its consequences.
One of the major lessons of Chernobyl was that nuclear accidents
can have transboundary effects.294 Fukushima’s lesson is different. It taught
the world that the current international system and the national regula-
tions it is meant to oversee are inadequate to provide for effective nuclear
safety or to prevent accidents. Japan, with its much-maligned regulatory
288 Id.
289 Id. at 1010.
290 Washington, supra note 180, at 436–40.
291 Cogan, supra note 156, at 322.
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of behavior are the position of that state in the international system as well as the nature
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system and sordid history of accidents, cover-ups, and collusion, is a poster
child for this failure. While the United States has a much cleaner record,
it also has seen its share of regulatory hiccups and has received its own
criticisms for its nuclear safety regime. Both nations have suffered in the
arena of public opinion, and the future of nuclear energy in both coun-
tries is now in doubt. If the nuclear energy industry is to survive in these
states—and globally—it must prove to the global public that it remains
a viable and safe energy source for the future, and states must prove that
they can effectively and reliably provide for this safety.
The current international system was designed to place as much
power in the hands of the states as possible, giving them control over the
enforcement of safety standards through the peer review process. The
IAEA was left with little more than supervisory and advisory power, though
it can provide technical and emergency assistance when requested. This
Note has made several recommendations to strengthen nuclear safety
across this system. First, states should do their part to ensure more safety,
primarily through the institution of greater transparency in their regula-
tory activities. Transparency not only provides myriad benefits for states
looking to ensure greater safety and garner positive public opinion about
nuclear energy, it is also mandated by international law. Both Japan and
the United States have room to institute greater transparency measures,
particularly during the siting and permitting processes.
This Note also made recommendations for the international orga-
nizations and, above all, the IAEA. The peer review process does provide
some benefits to international regulation, and addresses the sovereignty
concerns of the states. However, the process needs to be emphasized and
given greater significance. This would ensure that states take this process
and their responsibilities for monitoring safety in other states, as well as
their own, more seriously.
Additionally, the IAEA could be strengthened to ensure that there
is another monitoring and enforcing body beyond the states, in case they
cannot or will not live up to their peer review obligations. To this end, it
should be made clear to the world that the IAEA is a force to be taken seri-
ously, and that it cannot be ignored. It can back this up by being given
greater independence in funding, enforcement, and inspection. Currently,
the IAEA is hampered by its weak role in international nuclear regulation,
but a stronger international regulator could ensure that nations like Japan
do not allow another Fukushima to happen because they were sleeping on
the job, ignoring their regulatory responsibilities, and failing to implement
IAEA recommendations for safety.
